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In Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012a)—
henceforth, BGS (2012a)—we described a new 
approach to choice under risk that we called 
salience theory. In comparisons of risky lotter-
ies, we argued, individuals’ attention is drawn to 
those payoffs which are most different or salient 
relative to the average. In making choices, indi-
viduals overweight these salient payoffs relative 
to their objective probabilities. A simple for-
malization of such salience-based probability 
weighting provides an intuitive account of a vari-
ety of puzzling evidence in decision theory, such 
as Allais paradoxes and preference reversals.
Salience theory naturally lends itself to the 
analysis of the demand for risky assets. After all, 
risky assets are lotteries evaluated in a context 
described by the alternative investments avail-
able in the market. An asset’s salient payoff is 
naturally defined as one most different from 
the average market payoff in a given state of 
the world. We present a simple model of inves-
tor choice and market equilibrium in which 
salience influences the demand for risky assets. 
This model accounts for several time series and 
cross-sectional puzzles in finance in an intuitive 
way, based on its key implication that extreme 
payoffs receive disproportionate weight in the 
market valuation of assets.
We focus on four well known puzzles. First, 
salient thinking leads to a preference for assets 
characterized by the possibility of high, salient 
payoffs that are overweighted by investors. One 
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type of such assets are those exhibiting positive 
skewness. Barberis (2013) summarizes consid-
erable evidence that investors in fact overvalue 
such assets. Second, our theory helps explain the 
growth-value puzzle: growth stocks are over-
priced in the market because they have large 
salient upsides, while value stocks are under-
priced because they have salient downsides such 
as bankruptcy. Third, the model delivers a pref-
erence for safe assets over risky ones because, 
under the diminishing sensitivity property of 
salience introduced in BGS (2012a), investors 
focus on downside risks more than on equal-
sized upside risks, leading to an undervalua-
tion of risky assets. The model thus generates 
an equity premium (Mehra and Prescott 1985). 
Fourth, our theory predicts countercyclical vari-
ation in aggregate stock market returns. In bad 
times, the risky asset’s downside relative to the 
safe asset is salient, and, hence, the risky asset 
is underpriced. Conversely, in good times its 
upside is salient, leading to overvaluation and 
low expected returns. The logic of time-varying 
expected returns is captured naturally in our 
model, because all we need is that investors 
focus on payoffs that are extreme relative to the 
safe asset.
Our model shares some predictions with 
approaches to asset pricing based on Prospect 
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), such 
as Barberis and Huang (2008) and Barberis, 
Huang, and Santos (2001). We compare the two 
approaches after presenting the model.
I. Asset Payoffs and Salience Weighting
There are two periods t = 0, 1 and a measure 
1 of identical investors. Each investor has a lin-
ear utility function defined over consumption ( c 0 ,  c 1 ) in the two periods. Risk aversion plays 
no role in our analysis, and neither does time 
discounting. At t = 0, each investor receives an 
endowment  w 0 of the consumption good, as well 
as one unit of each one of the J > 1 available 
assets j = 1, … , J. At t = 1, there are S states 
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of nature s = 1, … , S, each occurring with 
probability  π s , with  ∑ s=1 S π s = 1. Asset j pays 
dividend  x js in state s ∈ S at t = 1.
Take a generic asset j. The salience of its 
payoff  x js depends on how  x js compares to the 
average market payoff  x s =  ∑ j   x js /J delivered 
by all the available assets in the same state s. 
Salience is thus defined within the “narrow 
frame” of objective asset payoffs and does not 
depend on investor-specific attributes such 
as own portfolio or wealth. Specifically, the 
salience function σ ( x js ,  x s ) satisfies two proper-
ties: (i) ordering: if interval  [ x, y ] is contained in 
a larger interval  [  x′ ,  y′ ] , then σ ( x, y ) < σ ( x′ ,  y′ ) ; (ii) diminishing sensitivity: for all x, y > 0 
and any ϵ > 0, σ ( x, y ) > σ ( x + ϵ, y + ϵ ) . 
Following BGS (2012b), we balance these 
two properties by using a salience function 
that is symmetric and homogenous of degree 
zero: σ ( α x, αy ) = σ ( x, y ) for any α > 0, with σ(0, 0) = 0. This implies that salience is an 
increasing function of the percentage difference 
between x and y, consistent with Weber’s law. 
An example of a salience function satisfying 
these properties is σ(x, y) = |x − y|/(x + y), 
where x, y > 0.
The payoff  x js that asset j pays in state s is 
more salient than the payoff  x j s ′  it pays in state  s′ 
if and only if σ ( x js ,  x s ) > σ ( x j s ′  ,  x  s ′  ) . Denote by 
r js the salience ranking of  x js , which ranges from 
1 (most salient) to S (least salient). In his valua-
tion of asset j, the investor weights payoff  x js by ω js =  δ  r js  /  ∑  s ′     π  s ′   δ  r j s ′   . Here δ ∈ (0, 1] captures 
the degree to which the investor neglects nonsa-
lient payoffs. If δ = 1, the weight  ω js is equal to 
1 for all s. This is the case of a rational investor. 
If instead δ < 1, the investor overweights salient 
payoffs at the expense of the nonsalient ones.
If an investor trades an amount  α j of each 
asset j, his expected utility at t = 0 is
(1)  ( w 0 −  ∑ 
j
 
 
 α j ⋅  p j ) +
   ∑ 
s
 
 
 π s  ( ∑ 
j
 
 
( α j + 1) ⋅  ω js ⋅  x js ) .
The first term in equation (1) is the first-
period consumption, which equals the investor’s 
wealth minus the expenditure on assets. The sec-
ond term in equation (1) is the expected value 
of the salience-weighted portfolio return (where α j + 1 is the endowment of asset j plus any extra 
amount bought or sold by the investor).
As in the Lucas (1978) tree model, an equi-
librium consists of: (i) optimal buying decisions α j by all investors, which come from maximizing 
equation (1), and (ii) market equilibrium  α j = 0, 
for all j. The first-order condition combined with 
market equilibrium yields the price of each asset j:
(2)  p j = 피 [ ω js ⋅  x js ] = 피 [ x js ] + cov [  ω js ,  x js ] .
The price of asset j is equal to the expected 
value of its future payoff  x js plus the covariance 
between payoffs and salience weights. If δ = 1, 
there are no salience distortions, namely  ω js = 1 
for all  x js . In this case, cov [  ω js ,  x js ] = 0, and the 
price of each asset j is its expected payoff 피 [  x js ] , 
the rational price. Since investors are risk neutral 
and do not discount the future, each risky asset 
yields a return equal to the interest rate of 1.
When δ < 1, each asset j commands a risk 
premium equal to −cov [  ω js ,  x js ] . When the 
lowest payoffs of an asset are the salient ones, 
namely cov [  ω js ,  x js ] < 0, the investor focuses on 
downside risks and demands a positive risk pre-
mium. When the highest payoffs are the salient 
ones, namely cov [  ω js ,  x js ] > 0, the investor 
focuses on the asset’s upside potential, and the 
risk premium is negative.
Equation (2) has several implications. First, 
if the asset’s payoffs are proportional to those 
on the market portfolio, its price is “rational.” 
An asset is misvalued only to the extent that it 
delivers unusually salient payoffs in some states. 
Formally, when  x js = λ ⋅  x s , with λ > 0 for all 
states s, all states are equally salient,  ω js = 1, 
and cov  [  ω js ,  x js ] = 0.
Second, although in equilibrium the inves-
tor holds the market portfolio, prices depend 
on each asset’s idiosyncratic risk. To see this 
clearly, suppose that there is no aggregate risk, 
namely,  x s = x in all states s. Any asset j then 
commands a risk premium due to idiosyncratic 
differences between its payoff  x js and the mar-
ket payoff x. This phenomenon arises from a 
type of “narrow framing”: salience is shaped 
by the payoffs of individual assets, not by the 
investor’s portfolio. When thinking about buy-
ing an extra share of Facebook stock, investors 
focus on the billion users and potential extraor-
dinary profits, and not on its impact on the pay-
off of the overall portfolio.
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Third, an investor’s willingness to pay for an 
asset is context dependent. Holding constant the 
payoff distribution of an asset j, the investor’s 
willingness to pay for it depends on the pay-
off distribution of the market  ( x s ) s∈S , and not (just) on the investor’s own portfolio. Changes 
in background context affect the salience of an 
asset’s payoffs and, thus, its price.
The implication that idiosyncratic risk affects 
security valuations is consistent with a good 
deal of empirical evidence (Barberis 2013, 
Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink 2010). The intuition 
is straightforward and plausible: investors think 
about individual assets, focus on their upsides 
and downsides, and value them according to 
what draws their attention. The next question is 
exactly what this implies for cross-sectional pat-
terns of asset pricing.
II. Taste for Skewness and the  
Growth-Value Puzzle
Suppose that there are three states of nature, 
s = 1, 2, 3, and that the market has no aggre-
gate risk, so that its payoff is  x s = x in all states. 
Asset j delivers a high payoff,  x j1 = x + G, in 
state 1, the market payoff  x j 2 = x in state 2, and 
a low payoff  x j 3 = x − L in state 3. For simplic-
ity, assume that  π 1 G =  π 3 L. The expected pay-
off of the asset, and, thus, its rational price, is 
then equal to  p j = x.
For our investor, the salience of  x js depends on 
how this payoff compares to the market payoff 
x. The upside is more salient than the downside 
when σ ( x + G, x ) > σ ( x − L, x ) . From homo-
geneity of degree zero of the salience function σ, 
this holds if and only if (x + G)(x − L) >  x  2 , or
(3)  G >  L _ 
1 − L/x .
The upside of asset j is likely to be salient if 
j features a large gain G (with a low probabil-
ity) and a small loss L (with a high probability) 
relative to its average payoff x. Keeping x fixed, 
condition (3) holds provided G is sufficiently 
higher than L. As the level of all payoffs x rises, 
diminishing sensitivity becomes weaker and the 
salience of payoffs is determined by the order-
ing property. In the limit, if G > L the investor 
focuses on the asset’s upside.
The salience ranking pins down the payoff 
weights  ω j1 ,  ω j2 ,  ω j3 . Given these weights, and 
under the assumption that  π 1 G =  π 3 L, the price 
of the asset is given by
(4)   p j = x +  π 1 G ⋅  [ ω j1 −  ω j3 ] .
Whether salient thinking causes the asset to be 
over- or underpriced relative to its rational value x 
depends on whether condition (3) holds. When (3) 
holds, the high payoff x + G is salient,  ω j1 >  ω j3 , 
and the asset is overpriced: investors overweight 
the opportunity of obtaining the high payoff 
x + G. When condition (3) is violated, the asset’s 
low payoff x − L is salient. Now  ω j3 >  ω j1 and 
the asset is underpriced. Investors overweight the 
risk of obtaining the low payoff x − L.
This mechanism provides insight into the 
well-known empirical finding (Fama and French 
1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994) 
that value stocks—those with low stock market 
prices relative to measures of “fundamentals” 
such as assets or earnings—earn higher aver-
age returns than growth stocks—those with high 
market prices relative to measures of fundamen-
tals. In our model, asset j fits the description of a 
“value stock” if it delivers a small upside G with 
high probability  π 1 and a big downside L, such as 
bankruptcy, with a low probability  π 3 (recall that 
 π 1 G =  π 3 L). In this case, condition (3) does not 
hold. As a consequence, the investor magnifies 
the downside risk of the value stock,  ω j3 >  ω j1 , 
so that by equation (4) the asset is underpriced. 
Alternatively, asset j is a “growth stock” if it 
yields a big upside G with a low probability  π 1 
and a small downside L with a high probability π 3 . In this case, if condition (3) holds, the inves-
tor thinks of the growth stock as an opportunity 
to obtain a large windfall, partly neglecting the 
fact that the growth stock has a sizable objective 
probability of a low payoff. From equation (4) 
such an asset is overpriced. In sum, in our model 
growth stocks are overvalued because, in con-
trast to value stocks, they have the possibility of 
delivering a very high payoff (becoming the next 
Google). In focusing on the role of payoffs (as 
opposed to probabilities), condition (3) differs 
from (in fact is stronger than) positive skewness.
This implication of the model is consistent with 
the empirical evidence we already mentioned, 
but it goes further. Fama and French (1992) 
conjecture that value stocks earn higher aver-
age returns because they are  disproportionately 
exposed to a separate risk factor, which they 
call distress risk. Subsequent research, however, 
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failed to find evidence that value stocks are par-
ticularly risky. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) find that stocks of companies vulnerable 
to the risk of bankruptcy if anything earn lower 
average returns, contrary to the Fama-French 
view that “value” reflects bankruptcy risk. In 
our model, value stocks are not fundamentally 
riskier, but the possibility of their bankruptcy is 
salient to investors, causing undervaluation. In 
contrast, growth stocks may themselves have a 
high risk of bankruptcy, but it is their greater 
upside that attracts investors’ attention, causing 
overvaluation. The model thus puts together the 
Fama-French intuition that investors fear bank-
ruptcy of value stocks with the observation that 
this possibility is salient and, thus, exaggerated.
More generally, this example shows that the 
extent to which certain asset payoffs “stand 
out” relative to the market may cause—through 
salience—distortions in the perception of asset 
specific risks and, thus, in asset prices, for 
instance helping to explain why right-skewed 
assets tend to be overvalued. Barberis (2013) 
reviews a large body of evidence, from individ-
ual stocks to IPOs, pointing to an overpricing of 
right-skewed assets in markets.
Since salience depends on the market con-
text, our model also predicts that the overpric-
ing of growth stocks should vary with market 
conditions. Holding constant the prospects of an 
individual right-skewed asset, improvements in 
market conditions should reduce its overpricing 
relative to other assets in the market.
III. Time-Varying Risk Premia
To analyze the implications of our model 
for time-varying risk premia, suppose there are 
only two assets in the market (J = 2): a risk 
free asset F with constant payoff f, and a risky 
asset that delivers a high payoff,  x j1 = x + G, 
in state 1 that occurs with probability π, and a 
lower payoff  x j 2 = x in state 2 that occurs with 
probability 1 − π. The sure payoff lies between 
the highest and lowest risky payoff, namely, 
x < f < x + G.
The average market payoff is then equal 
to  x 1 =  ( x + G + f  ) /2 in state 1 and 
x 2 = (x + f  )/2 in state 2, so that the market 
displays aggregate risk. In this context, we can 
think of “good times” as x being high, poten-
tially close to f. Bad times are defined as low 
x. The variance of the risky asset’s payoffs does 
not depend on the times, i.e., does not depend on 
x. We also consider what happens if good times 
are defined by π being large.
The safe asset is priced at f, so it provides a 
return equal to the interest rate of 1. In a rational 
world, the risky asset is priced at p = x + πG. 
Since the investor is risk neutral, the price 
changes one for one with x, and the asset again 
yields a return of 1.
With salient thinking, the investor perceives 
the risky asset’s downside to be salient when
(5)   x + G __   ( x + G + f  ) /2  <  
 ( x + f  ) /2
 _x  ,
and its upside as salient otherwise. Condition (5) 
says that the downside is salient when the risky 
asset’s loss relative to the safe asset is proportion-
ally larger than its gain. Given a salience ranking, 
the price of the risky asset is then given by
(6)  p = x +  ω 1 πG.
By comparing p with the fundamental 
price x + πG, we see that the risky asset is 
underpriced (the risk premium is positive) 
when its downside is salient, because in this 
case  ω 1 = δ/(πδ + [1 − π]) < 1. In contrast, 
the risky asset is overpriced (the risk premium is 
negative) when its upside is salient, because in 
this case  ω 1 = 1/(π + [1 − π]δ) > 1.
Equation (6) implies that the risk premium 
( 1 −  ω 1 ) πG is countercyclical: it decreases in 
the average payoff x. This is because salience 
switches as market conditions change. When the 
fundamentals x of the risky asset deteriorate, its 
upside x + G gets closer to the safe payoff f. This 
makes the downside of the risky asset salient, 
triggering a positive risk premium. When instead 
the fundamentals x of the risky asset improve, its 
downside x gets closer to the safe payoff f. In this 
case, the risky asset’s upside becomes salient, 
and the risk premium turns negative.
The role of market movements in affecting, 
through salience, the risks that investors attend 
to can help shed new light on the observed coun-
tercyclical variation in risk premia (Campbell 
and Shiller 1988). When fundamentals are good, 
investors focus on the upside of future payoffs 
and overvalue the market. When fundamentals 
are poor, investors focus on the downside of 
future payoffs and undervalue the market.
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Equation (6) also implies that investors over-
react to news about salient payoffs and under-
react to news about nonsalient payoffs. Suppose 
that the risky asset’s upside is salient so that 
the risk premium is negative,  ω 1 > 1. Then an 
increase in the risky asset’s upside G causes a 
disproportionate increase in its price, and, thus, 
a reduction in the risk premium. Similarly, if the 
probability of the asset’s salient upside is small, π <  √ _ δ/ ( 1 +  √ _ δ) , the investor overreacts to 
news about π, and good news (increase in π) 
leads to a further reduction in the risk premium.
This example is readily extended to include 
many risky assets. Since most risky assets are not 
sufficiently right skewed relative to the market, 
their downsides are salient, by the diminishing 
sensitivity property of salience. This leads to an 
overall undervaluation of the market, an equity 
premium (Mehra and Prescott 1985).1 Still, 
since the available right-skewed stocks are more 
likely to be overvalued in good times, the model 
generates, in the aggregate, a  countercyclical (positive) risk premium.
IV. Conclusion
We conclude by comparing our paper to the 
work based on Prospect Theory. Barberis and 
Huang (2008) study the implications of prob-
ability weighting for the cross-section of stock 
returns. They show that overweighting small 
probabilities associated with extreme events 
leads to the pricing of idiosyncratic skewness. 
In our model, extreme payoffs are overweighted 
not because they have small probabilities but 
because they are salient relative to the market 
payoff. This has two implications. First, in our 
model the relevant notion of positive skewness 
is not defined in isolation, but relative to alter-
native investments. Second, in our model inves-
tors overreact to changes in the probability of 
salient payoffs, even if these payoffs have size-
able probabilities.
These features allow us to naturally account 
for time-varying risk premia. It is harder for 
Prospect Theory’s standard probability weight-
ing function to do so, unless it is assumed 
1 Because the price of the market portfolio equals the 
sum of the prices of the individual assets composing it, the 
market is undervalued, namely, there is an equity premium, 
if and only if the assets are on average undervalued. From 
equation (2) this holds when  ∑ j  co v s [  ω js ,  x js ] < 0. 
that during booms individual assets become 
more positively skewed. In a recession, when 
the objective probability of left-tail payoffs 
increases, standard probability weighting would 
imply that the low payoff will be less over-
weighted than before. Similarly, when the objec-
tive probability of right-tail payoffs decreases, 
the high payoff will be more overweighted than 
before. This suggests that risk aversion should 
increase in good times and decrease in bad 
times, which appears counterfactual.
To address these problems, models using 
Prospect Theory rely on its other features to 
explain the evidence, particularly loss aversion 
and time-varying reference points. Benartzi and 
Thaler (2000) show that loss-averse investors 
require a large premium to hold equity. Barberis, 
Huang, and Santos (2001) extend this argument 
to a dynamic setting, in which recent gains or 
losses are only slowly incorporated into an 
investor’s reference point, leading to shifts in his 
risk aversion, so that in good times the investor 
expects, and receives, a lower premium. In con-
trast, our model predicts that the equity premium 
is driven not by preferences but by the salience 
of market payoffs: in good times the investor 
perceives the risky assets to be better than they 
really are. As a consequence, investors’ expecta-
tions of payoffs are themselves cyclical.
In sum, our model can account for the basic 
cross-sectional and time-series puzzles in asset 
pricing using one simple idea that an investor 
focuses on salient payoffs of an asset, which 
are those that stand out from the average (mar-
ket portfolio that includes the riskless asset). 
As a consequence, assets with large upsides 
are overpriced. Assets with large downsides 
are underpriced. The model yields several new 
implications and can be extended to concave 
utility and to more dynamic environments. We 
leave this to future work.
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